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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RASCOFF’S  
PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Philip Bobbitt∗ 
Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence1 reflects both 
the conceptual and research strengths of the author, which are formi-
dable, and the practical difficulties of intelligence reform, which are no 
less so.  Rascoff is certainly right that to be effective — in the still-
unfolding constitutional environment that must contend with terror 
groups armed with unprecedented weapons and communications tech-
nology — the intelligence community (IC) must act within the law and 
the rules governing that community must be reformed to make this 
possible.  He is inclined to believe that the answer lies in heightened 
presidential management.  I’m not so sure.  The actual presidential 
control over the vast intelligence apparatus is much more extensive 
than Presidential Intelligence acknowledges,2 although it is so secreted 
in the daily flow of tasking, decisionmaking,3 and after-action report-
ing that few outside a very limited number of White House offices can 
actually know and appreciate its extent.  I am very doubtful that the 
mistakes attributed to the zeal of the IC were committed without di-
rection from the most senior officials in the Bush and Obama Admin-
istrations.  Moreover, Rascoff’s proposals to enhance presidential con-
trol may well be eclipsed by the recent announcements made by 
Director John Brennan about the reorganization of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) because Brennan’s proposals go to the real prob-
lem with the intelligence agencies of the United States. 
That problem4 is not an insubordinate IC, but one less effective 
than it might be, although I agree that organizational reform can make 
an important, positive contribution.  The CIA was created in 1947; 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School; Distinguished 
Senior Lecturer, University of Texas Law School. 
 1 Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2016). 
 2 Professor Carrie Cordero’s piece in the Forum nicely captures the various executive initia-
tives that have prevailed since 9/11.  She aptly concludes, “This is hardly a short list of presiden-
tial disengagement.”  See Carrie Cordero, A Response to Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential 
Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 104, 105 (2016).  And of course there are many instruments of 
presidential control that predate 9/11, such as the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, formerly 
the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board. 
 3 The bureaucratic process of NSC oversight of sensitive collection by the intelligence agen-
cies is accurately described in Stephen Slick’s essay, Comment on Presidential Intelligence, 129 
HARV. L. REV. F. 110, 113–14 (2016), at least as I have experienced that process. 
 4 I am aware that it is a commonplace error of critics who complain that the author has not 
addressed the problems the critics insist are salient.  Perhaps sometimes the commonplace, how-
ever, is not erroneous. 
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President Harry Truman explained that its purpose was to prevent an-
other Pearl Harbor.5  Nevertheless, despite many successes in the Cold 
War, the U.S. intelligence community was unable to prevent the sur-
prise attack on New York and Washington in 2001.  Almost a year lat-
er, the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) concluding that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear 
weapons program, among other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).6  
A subsequent review by the Iraq Survey Group determined that this 
assessment was inaccurate and premature.7  The NIE also claimed 
that Iraq’s biological weapons capability had surpassed the arsenal it 
had amassed before the first Gulf War and that Iraq had developed 
mobile biological weapons labs.8  The NIE claimed that Iraq had ob-
tained unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver biological weapons and that 
it had resumed its production of chemical weapons and had accumu-
lated stockpiles up to 500 metric tons.9  All these conclusions were 
wrong. 
The commissions convened to analyze the 9/11 and Iraqi WMD 
failures found little in common.  The 9/11 Commission Report faulted 
the IC’s failure to share information within the community: “With 
each agency holding one or two pieces of the puzzle, none could see 
the whole picture.”10  There was a “failure [to] ‘connect[] the dots.’”11  
The inattention, even uninterest, of the President regarding al Qaeda 
before the attacks was, if anything, a contributing factor, something a 
more intensive control of intelligence collection priorities by the White 
House could only have made worse.  The WMD Commission Report, 
by contrast, found that rather than a failure to share information, it 
was the general conformity of the analysts in different agencies, work-
ing from a few pieces of widely shared intelligence, that got the picture 
wrong.12  These analysts had enthusiastically connected the dots, cre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 56 (1956). 
 6 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 2002–16HC, 
IRAQ’S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 5 (2002), http:// 
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBC6-XCW8]. 
 7 CHARLES DUELFER, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE 
DCI ON IRAQ’S WMD ch. 4 (2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq 
_wmd_2004/chap4.html [https://perma.cc/6XBV-9636]. 
 8 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 6. 
 9 Id. 
 10 COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 171 (2005), 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS2F-8S2X] [hereinafter Iraq WMD 
Report]; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT 355 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/4Z7F-3YXY]. 
 11 Iraq WMD Report, supra note 10, at 171. 
 12 Id. 
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ating a myth much as drawing lines connecting the constellations cre-
ated images of a hunter, a bear, a bull, and a boastful if beautiful 
queen that were in the end only stars.  It seems that there was too 
much presidential (and vice-presidential) guidance. 
These two historic fiascos did share something, however: the fun-
damental structure of problem-solving within CIA and throughout the 
IC.13  That structure is determined by the following dichotomies: 
(1) the division between the public and private sectors; (2) the separation 
between the domestic and the international; (3) the different rules we ap-
ply to law enforcement and intelligence operations; (4) the different reli-
ance we place on secret as opposed to open sources (newspapers, articles, 
and monographs, or interviews with their authors); (5) the distinction be-
tween intelligence collection and analysis; and finally, (6) the differing roles 
of intelligence producer and intelligence consumer.14 
And although these structuring distinctions enabled the U.S. intelli-
gence services to successfully navigate the challenges posed by agencies 
operating in secret in the Cold War, the disasters of 9/11 and Iraqi 
WMD can be directly attributed to them.15 
CIA Director Brennan’s reforms are an effort to overcome this 
structure and the problems it imposes as the United States confronts a 
new intelligence reality — a reality that is more diffuse, where the col-
lection of human intelligence is more difficult, and where America’s 
adversaries are more innovative. 
The key reform is the creation of “mission centers” not linked to 
any particular CIA directorate, each center being led by an assistant 
director.  Do not be misled by the fact that the mission centers, like the 
directorates from which they draw personnel (and like their counter-
parts at State or Defense), are organized regionally and functionally.  
The creation of these centers represents a profound change.  Each cen-
ter will have teams of analysts and operators working side-by-side who 
are drawn from the directorates.  Each center will have responsibility 
for espionage, analysis, and covert action within its assigned mission 
area.  Indeed, it is most significant that the current National Counter-
terrorism Center (NCTC) provides a precedent for these mission cen-
ters, because the changes in terrorism since al Qaeda emerged to de-
clare war on the United States represent a threatening phenomenon 
that is most challenging to those six structuring dichotomies: al Qaeda 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 I have similarly discussed these intelligence failures and Brennan’s proposed reforms in an 
unpublished address to the Royal United Services Institute last year.  Philip Bobbitt, Reshaping 
the Modern Intelligence Community, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00 
AM), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/reshaping-modern-intelligence-community [https://perma 
.cc/8N8E-RMXN].  For an analysis of the underlying “antinomies” that give rise to these struc-
tural issues, see PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008). 
 14 BOBBITT, supra note 13, at 296–97. 
 15 See id. ch. 6 (chapter titled “Intelligence, Information and Knowledge”). 
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outsources its activities, merging private and public spheres; it oper-
ates across borders, moving between the domestic and the internation-
al, unconfined by any particular state territory; it commits crimes to 
further its political goals, and in fact depends upon criminal activity to 
operate; it is difficult to penetrate but advertises itself relentlessly in 
the media, including social media; it requires the closest collaboration 
between producer and customer to confront it because the usual cus-
tomers in the policymaking departments can’t be relied upon to ask 
for briefings or task analysts in such novel and unpredictable circum-
stances; and its defeat cannot be achieved if analysts are unsure of the 
sources of the information on which they rely and collectors are not 
tightly confined to information that is actually useful to analysts, a re-
quirement that is far from obvious when we move away from state-on-
state collection.16 
The most important objective of this reorganization, however, is 
not simply to enhance collaboration by the colocation of analysts and 
collectors and by organizing around missions and objectives, or even to 
achieve a greater coherence than the structure we inherited from the 
Cold War.  Rather, that objective is to create accountability through 
the assistant directors.  At present, responsibility is diffused among the 
directorates and there is no one person the CIA director can call on to 
summarize future trends, current operations, and threats in any par-
ticular area outside counterterrorism and counterintelligence.  The 
head of the directorate for operations is responsible for collection but 
not for the use to which the information that is collected is put; the di-
rector for intelligence is responsible for analysis but not for the reliabil-
ity of the intelligence on which the analysis is based, and so on.17 
The Snowden/Silicon Valley problems on which Rascoff focuses18 
are grounded in objections to the IC’s collection practices.  Subjecting 
these practices — the sensitive “sources and methods” that are invoked 
by the IC when it fears exposure — to greater scrutiny may well be 
necessary to regain the legitimacy of the IC in the public’s eyes, but 
such exposure is fraught with danger.  As recently as October 10, 2015, 
the Editorial Board of the New York Times wrote an article entitled 
Why Is Money Still Flowing to ISIS?19  Apparently the editorial 
board of the Times is innocent of the knowledge that it was the 
Times’s own reporting — over the passionate objections of the White 
House — that exposed the penetration of the SWIFT banking trans-
fers system by the US which had been so important in identifying and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Bobbitt, supra note 13. 
 18 Rascoff, supra note 1, at 659–69. 
 19 Editorial, Why Is Money Still Flowing to ISIS?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/why-is-money-still-flowing-to-isis.html. 
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thwarting terrorist financing.20  To be fair, the Times’s public editor 
later expressed regret over this.21  Perhaps someday, as part of a plea 
bargain no doubt, Mr. Snowden can be brought to concede that what-
ever the benefits of his actions, some of those benefits have accrued to 
the very organizations and states who are our adversaries. 
There are executive agencies that deem themselves apart from 
presidential control; in some respects the post-Watergate Department 
of Justice has evolved in the direction of Vestal Virgins rather than in 
response to the wishes of the incumbent in the White House.  The lu-
dicrous and embarrassing arrest of an Indian vice-consul in New 
York22 is a recent consequence of this hermetic separation of infor-
mation sharing and decision making from supervision and direction  
by the President.  But the IC is not at the top of this list, by a large 
margin. 
I hope that I am not totally insensitive to the public’s concern 
about the chagrin and embarrassment a failed or faulty espionage op-
eration can cause, though I imagine the news media is more acutely 
sensitive to such matters than the public at large, perhaps in an excess 
of schadenfreude toward a fellow institution engaged in not dissimilar 
activities.  The New York Times Rule — “never do anything you 
wouldn’t want to see reported on the front page of the New York 
Times” — is, as Slick points out,23 a perfectly awful guide to govern in-
telligence collection not only because it puts embarrassment ahead of 
effectiveness but also because it would animate a self-censorship that 
would disappoint even the investigative journalists who profess to be 
most outraged on behalf of their readers by the conduct they relish in 
exposing. 
Before we adopt Rascoff’s proposed reforms, we had better satisfy 
ourselves that (1) the description he gives of an IC insufficiently teth-
ered to presidential oversight is accurate and (2) that the reforms he 
proposes would not only address this lapse of control — if it exists — 
but would make the work of the IC more effective by making it more 
responsive to the needs of the President and the country.  That is why 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?pagewanted 
=all.  See Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2008) (reviewing ERIC 
LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008)), https:// 
newrepublic.com/article/64747/secrecy-and-safety [https://perma.cc/V7BW-CYT5], for a withering 
dismantling of the claims that this disclosure was not really so terribly damaging. 
 21 Byron Calame, Can “Magazines” of the Times Subsidize News Coverage?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
22, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/opinion/22pubed.html?pagewanted=all. 
 22 Annie Gowen, Arrest of Indian Diplomat in New York Sparks U.S.-India Tensions, 
 WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/arrest-of 
- i n d i a n - d i p l o m a t - i n - n e w - y o r k - s p a r k s - u s - i n d i a - t e n s i o n s / 2 0 1 3 / 1 2 / 1 7 / 0 9 d 1 d 8 1 e - 6 7 1 4 - 1 1 e 3 - 9 9 7 b 
-9213b17dac97_story.html [https://perma.cc/4XZN-ZJY3]. 
 23 Slick, supra note 3, at 116. 
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I think the Brennan reforms are to be much preferred.  Effectiveness 
and oversight should not be opposing goals.  When they are, the analy-
sis and the prescriptions must be rethought. 
 
